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IDENTITY NOTES PART ONE: PLAYING IN
THE LIGHT*
ADRIENNE D. DAVIs**
What parts do the invention and development of whiteness play in
the construction of what is loosely described as "American"?'
INTRODUCTION
There is now a well-developed and compelling body of scholarship
challenging the notion that race is either a natural or a scientific
category.2 Scholarly treatments regarding the social construction of
race are still finding their way into law and legal scholarship.' Most
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This Essay had its origins in a panel held during the Washington College of Law at American
University's conference on Race, Law and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the American
Dilemma on September 21, 1995. The title of my panel, "Beyond Black and White: Race-
Conscious Policies and the 'Other Minorities,'" crafted by the conference organizers
accomplishes subtly several things that I hope to continue in more explicit fashion in this Essay.
The title challenges false binary racial logic from the position of groups who are neither Black
nor white. It also foregrounds the history behind the development of this dominant model of
binary reasoning about race and law in America.
The conference was co-sponsored by the Program on Law and Government, The American
University Law Review, and the Asian and Pacific Law Students Association. Each of these
organizations, as well as my colleagues Jamin Raskin and Thomas Sargentich, are to be
commended for their efforts. I would like to thank Robert Chang for his inspiration and
engagement, and James Boyle, Jim May, Jamin Raskin, and Joan Williams for their helpful
comments and suggestions. I would also would like to express to Stephanie Wildman and Trina
Grillo my sincere appreciation for all of our conversations and work over the years that sparked
these thoughts in my mind. Simone Wennik provided superb research assistance.
1. TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK-WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION 9
(1992).
2. See generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (1994); KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY FATHER'S
HOUSE: AFRICA IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE (1992). See also GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE
OF PREJUDICE (1954) (a germinal text in the sociology of race and prejudice).
3. Legal scholars doing work in the field of racial taxonomy or architecture include Ian
F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and
Choica 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Haney L6pez, Social Construction]; Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color Blind, "44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter
Gotanda, "Our Constitution Is Color Blind"I; Neil Gotanda, "Other Non-Wites" in American Legal
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of these treatments argue that race is socially constructed. This Essay
makes a different point. Using two cases from the early and mid-
nineteenth century, I discuss how race is socially constructed, why it
matters, and how the process can appear in issues as dry as an
allocation of the burden of proof. In particular, I focus on the
construction of whiteness, which, I argue, drives the process of legally
classifying groups of color.
A focus on the politics of local contests invites an archaeological
exploration of historic sites where a black/white paradigm of race was
in crisis and vulnerable to correction. In each of these crises,
however, the force of the paradigm itself prevailed, reinscribing itself
with yet more force in law and the lives of all three groups implicated:
African Americans, other groups of color, and whites. An historical
assessment of the relationship of other groups of color to a
black/white paradigm reveals the paradigm as not only undescriptive
and inaccurate, but debilitating for legal analysis, as well as civil rights
oriented organizing.'
The two cases reveal distinct dynamics of the binary model, which
I suggest is hegemonic for the following reasons. A primary mecha-
nism of this model is its disciplining function on other groups of
color seeking legal rights and recognition. It is an organizing
principle for knowledge (here, law), it has an internal hierarchy of
power, it masks this hierarchy through a seemingly neutral shell of
"race," and it operates as self-reinforcing through its disciplining
mechanism. In addition, in classicly hegemonic fashion, the paradigm
includes rules that prove to be internally inconsistent. The cases
reveal the internal contradiction of the rules employed by courts to
establish racial identity at law. In one opinion, jurists use mutually
exclusive determinations of racial identity in resolving a single legal
matter. The underlying facts and interests involved suggest that the
court's reasoning was driven not by the interests of the immediate
parties, but rather by a larger, perhaps unconscious, desire to define
white identity and secure white liberty interests.5
Histoiy: A Review ofJustice at War, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1186 (1985) [hereinafter Gotanda, "Other
Non-Whitesj (reviewing PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983)); D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made
Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 GEO. LJ. 437 (1993). See also Cheryl I. Harris,
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993) (describing economic privilege accruing to
whiteness and its impact on "passing").
4. See generally William R. Tamayo, When the "GCooreds" Are Neither Black Nor Citizens: The
United States Civil Rights Movement and Global Migration, 2 ASIAN U.J. 1 (1995) (discussing
impediments imposed by paradigm in recent history and current anti-immigrant climate).
5. In this sense, it might be more descriptive to label the paradigm as dyadic, rather than
binary, in that the designation of race appears to be inextricably linked to the task of
configuring whiteness.
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Finally, I hope that the contrast of the two cases demonstrates that
the black/white paradigm exercises influence on legal reasoning
across time and geographic space, and also that the paradigm itself
appears to be a natural ordering, obscuring the assumption of a white
subject position. Though involving seemingly unrelated legal
conflicts, the cases are linked together through the discursive
structure formed by binarism. It orders the legal logic and rhetoric
of the judges, as well as the arguments of the litigants. Both cases
prove to be inescapably embedded with racial determinations and,
inevitably, legal constructions.
What follows stems from a series of discussions, and remains an
inquiry directed toward certain suggestive episodes within a much
broader history that I leave to others to continue to explore and
excavate.6
I. DREAMING IN BLACK AND WHITE IN NICARAGUA
During the summer of 1992, I participated in a property-rights
conference in Nicaragua. In my free time, I wandered the streets of
Le6n with old and new colleagues, looking for leather goods and
dreaming of the heroes honored in the murals. As I met more
Nicaraguans, I realized that my prior forays outside of the United
States to France and the Bahamas had not prepared me for a country
where race was not governed by the politics and economics of black
and white. I found myself negotiating not merely the politics of Coca-
Cola roofed houses,' but also a foreign structure of race into which
I (alarmingly) seemed to fit nowhere and everywhere.
Until then, I had always been Black in the American imaginary. My
skin tone is coffee with cream or double latte, depending on your
coffee aesthetic. With big lips (now considered "full" I suppose) and
curly hair, my phenotype guaranteed my racial designation through
most of my life. With this phenotype, bom in 1965, I have been
"black" in both capital and lowercase, Afro-American, African-
American. When I was fifteen I was even called a "colored girl" by an
older white man who I do not think meant offense as he said it in the
process of giving me a scholarship.' The names may have changed
6. Because of the nature of this Essay, it is limited to close readings of cases. For the
reader interested in broader analyses, see sources cited supra note 3.
7. One of my colleagues explained to me that companies will paint people's roofs or the
sides of barns if in exchange the company may paint a super-sized version of its logo. I have not
seen this in the United States, but I understand that it is also a practice in some parts of the
country.
8. "Colored," I believe, is an especially grating racial label as it is a reminder of the
juxtaposition between "white" and "colored" facilities during the Jim Crow era of segregation.
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to protect the innocent, but the significance of being the opposite of
white never did. Although now I am an academic who studies race
as a social construct, my own appearance had always warranted racial
certainty. In America, I could never "pass."
Upon arriving in Managua, however, the racial certainty I brought
with me from the States evaporated. The features that locate me as
Black in America do not map onto the unfamiliar turns and curves of
the Nicaraguan structure of race. In Le6n, I learned that my brown
skin and pouting lips might make me Miskito/Spanish, Caribbe-
an/Spanish, African/Spanish, perhaps even pure Miskito. My brown
skin was only the beginning of the interrogation rather than the end,
an initial descriptor rather than a final conclusion. I slipped through
the cracks of the Nicaraguan racial regime. I began to feel somewhat
of a spectacle as children pointed and were scolded for doing so by
adults who were trying to hide their own stares.' I still remember
with vivid affection one little girl selling candy at a concert we
attended. She alternated between charming my group into giving her
precious American dollars and returning to my side to interrogate me
about my looks, which she could not fathom.
My intention is not to romanticize the seeming racial fluidity I
encountered in Nicaragua while condemning racial practices in the
United States. Even during my short stay in Nicaragua, it became
clear that race was controversial and politically salient there:
historically determined and heavily regulated. During the course of
the international conference, entitled Revolution, Participatory
Democracy, and Property: Nicaraguan Property Regime After Sandinistan
Land Reform, 10 speakers and audience members made repeated
reference to the marginalization of Miskito Indians within both the
national politics and the academic discourse of property rights. The
texture of the debate and arguments demonstrated to me that this
9. "Spectacle: 1 a: something exhibited to view; usu[ally]: something exhibited as
unusual and notable: a remarkable or noteworthy sight: an impressive display esp(ecially] for
entertainment b: an object of curiosity or contempt esp(ecially] by reason of silly or
inappropriate behavior... c (1): a public display appealing or intended to appeal to the eye
by its mass, proportions, color, or other dramatic qualities... (2): a motion picture employing
massively impressive scenery and much crowd action, usu[ally] set in past time, and commonly
dealing with a historical or religious theme." WEaSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2188 (3d ed. 1986).
Lest anyone argue that my experience was due to some other cultural factor (e.g., dress or
conduct), I asked several of my Nicaraguan colleagues whether I was doing anything to call
attention to myself. They responded that the residents of Le6n probably had not seen anyone
who looked like me before.
10. Sponsored by Capital Law School, Le6n, Nicaragua, Aug. 18-20, 1992.
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marginalization was also contested in other areas of rights and
participation.
My own racial anxiety increased when, after three days in the
conference room of 300, I concluded that while my own racial appear-
ance may have been contested, that of the Nicaraguans was not. The
conference participants readily marked and distinguished the Miskito
Indians as well as their privileged counterparts, the Spanish.
Nicaragua indeed had its own complex map of racial relations and
domination." The only trouble was that they could not map me.
The conference concluded and my trip ended. After a long and
exhausting trip from Le6n to Managua on my way to Miami, I was
joyful to find myself back in the United States. As Miami is a port of
entry, one of the tense American spaces where the border is drawn
taut, there were ranges of browns there, a melee of accents and
languages. 2 Miami is one of many physical border sites in the
United States.' In these places, race is recognized as more fluid, in
contrast to its seeming fixity in most other American places. My own
racial identity was rapidly renegotiated from open and fluid into the
fixity of American Blackness. I was comforted to be once again in a
space where people were searching for my "Blackness," seeking to
identify and mark it, making it available for regulation. My recollec-
tion of myself hours earlier standing in front of the mural of Che
Guevara, free and bereft of my racial identity, faded into memory. As
I sought sleep on the plane from Miami to California, I fell with relief
into the looming, dark category of Blackness.
11. Likewise, during my travels in France, it became clear that the French had a different
system of racial coding than the American one. People routinely assumed that I was French,
but of what they call "mixed" (mitisse) descent, referring to a child of a Black African and a
white parent. Although mildly disconcerting, this assumption remained grounded in black and
white and did not confound my sense of identity in the way that my travels in Nicaragua did.
Both the French and American systems of binary racial coding stem from the negotiation of
the West's encounter with Africa. A project for another time is to examine the distinctions
between the politics of racial labeling stemming from the political economies of European
imperialism versus domestic chattel slavery.
12. Legal scholars of "border theory" identify and discuss the distinctive functioning of
borders for different racial groups. See generally Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves': Seuring
Black People's Right to Shop and to Sell in WMite America, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 147 (exploring how
borders of legality and illegality in informal markets affect Black Americans); Robert S. Chang,
A Meditation on Borders, in THE NEW NATIVsSm (Juan F. Perea ed., forthcoming 1996) (describing
how borders are constructed to run parallel to notions of "foreignness"); Richard Thompson
Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV, 1843 (1994)
(discussing role of color-blind laws and policies in maintaining Black racial segregation);Juan
F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965 (1995)
(discussing ways in which Latino/as may be "symbolically deported").
13. Cf Chang, supra note 12. Chang warns that "the border is not just on the periphery.
For example, if a Korean national flies from Seoul and lands in Kansas, the border will be there
to greet her. The border is everywhere." I&
699
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
II. THE TYRANNY OF CATEGORIES
My Nicaraguan experience impressed upon me the contingency of
systems of racial classification. Despite sometimes dramatic efforts to
fix it through complex systems of racial tracking 4 and surveil-
lance, ' 5 "race" itself remains a concept that we continually invent
and construct. 6 Yet, as the recent debates over the verdict in the
O.J. Simpson trial demonstrate, most Americans, of all races, do not
view race as indeterminate, but rather as physically cognizable, stable,
and culturally significant. Moreover, as a culture, we locate race
primarily in black and white. My story about traveling in Nicaragua
suggests that racial taxonomies are local and political, rather than
universal and scientific. I cannot be located on the Nicaraguan racial
map, and I map imperfectly onto the French one. 7 Thus far, only
in the United States is my race determined and determinate.
How then, does binarism affect law and legal study? One effect of
the paradigm I will suggest before discussing the cases is how the
articulation of the model itself as a "black/white paradigm" masks a
driving mechanism of the model. In the phrasing "black/white," the
paradigm appears dyadic, and internally neutral, as though Blacks and
whites were equally situated within the model. Yet the cases discussed
below suggest that a primary motivation in the crafting of the
American racial architecture may not have been a pure desire to have
a taxonomy for classifying races, but to define and protect specifically
white identity.
This search for white identity has been documented by Nobel
Laureate Toni Morrison in her collection of critical literary essays that
provide the epigraph for this Essay. She argues that whiteness as a
discrete concept remains largely unexcavated in American culture."8
Her readings of classic nineteenth-century literature indicate that
14. See, e.g., State v. Treadaway, 52 So. 500, 508 (La. 1910) (distinguishing between griff
(child of biracial "mulatto" and Black) and quadroon (child of biracial "mulatto" and white)).
Louisiana's system survived (in modified form) until it was abrogated through legislation. 42
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 267 (West 1990), repeated by, 1983 LA. ACTs 441 § 1. As late as 1974,
however, the Louisiana courts upheld the state's interest in tracking African ancestry to the
fractional degree. See Plaia v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 296 So. 2d 809, 810 (La. 1974).
15. See generally Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law, 8 RARiTAN 39 (1988) (discussing
antimiscegenation statutes and cases as examples of regulation and scrutiny of sexual and
property relations).
16. See generally OMI & WiNANT, supra note 2. See also Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and
Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master's House, 10 BE.RKELEY WOMEN's LJ. 16 (1995)
(discussing movement to recognize biraciality as distinct racial formation).
17. Seesupranote 11.
18. MORuSON, supra note 1, at 9, 31-59 (discussing not only literary references to racial
whiteness, but also limited use of color white in early American literature).
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whiteness became largely defined by its opposite: color, and more
specifically, blackness. 9
The dynamic suggested by Morrison has been reflected among
blossoming legal thinkers in my seminars on race and law. I routinely
ask the students to define "Black culture." A variety of attributions
pour out: emotion and soul, instinct and intuition, violence and
passion, drive and pride, spirituality and strength. Yet when I ask for
the cultural attributes or meaning of "white culture" the students are
stumped, sometimes disturbed. I have yet to have a student attach a
meaning that is not a stand-in for a more specific class-based or ethnic
culture rather than a more broad-ranging racial culture of whiteness.
After six seminars, whiteness (unmodified) has remained devoid of
content in my classroom.
I am not raising the absence of meaning for whiteness in an effort
to have exaggerated, stereotypical, and demeaning content ascribed
to Euro-Americans. I emphasize the void around whiteness rather to
illuminate the embeddedness of dyadic and polarizing logic in the
American racial paradigm.
Other racial groups form their identity around shared cultural
norms, common histories of immigration or migration, mythologized
homelands, or racial oppression. ° Non-Hispanic white American
identity appears to be formed solely around the experience of being
not Black, Asian, or Latino/a.2 ' White Americans do not appear to
have a sense of racial identity that is not linked to ethnicity or class,
unless juxtaposing themselves against Blacks, Asian Americans, or
sometimes Latinos/as.2 Hence, construction of colored identities
is critical to the maintenance of white identity. It is against the
backdrop of engaging whiteness as ajuxtaposition to racialized color
in general, and blackness in particular, that I will examine two cases
19. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 9, 31-59. Professor Ian Haney L6pez makes an analogous
point within law through close readings of late-nineteenth century cases. See Ian F. Haney
L6pez, White by Law, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY-THE CUTTING EDGE 542 (Richard Delgado ed.,
1995) (hereinafter Haney L6pez, White by Law]; see also STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE
REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (forthcoming 1996) (with
contributions by Margalynne Armstrong, Adrienne D. Davis & Trina Grillo). For discussion of
Native Americans and this issue, see infra Part III.
20. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 2, at 57-69.
21. Wildman would argue that racial privilege, or the ability to enjoy the fruits of whiteness
without committing personal acts of domination, also defines white identity. SeewiLDMAN, supra
note 19.
22. For a discussion of white racial identity, see generally ANDREW HACKER, TWo NATIONS:
BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE
ABOLITION OF WHITENESS: ESSAYS ON RACE, POLITICS, AND WORKING CLASS HISTORY (1994);
DAVID R. ROEDIGER, WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING
CLASS (1991).
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in which non-Black groups of color negotiated the black/white
paradigm in efforts to secure their own civil rights. The appearance
of whiteness as an organizing legal principle becomes critical in
understanding both the disciplining mechanism and the maintenance
of contradictory rules of law and race.
III. YEARNING TO BE FREE
The cases included below are suggestive (though obviously not
exhaustive) instances of the binary mode of racial reasoning at work
in the lives of groups of color who are not African American. I hope
that my close readings of these two cases illuminate some of the
dynamics of binary legal logic that may prove to be at work in other
historical (and contemporary) instances. As noted earlier, the cases
indicate that a binary paradigm appears to be present in not only
explicitly political, rights-based cases, but also in straight procedural
matters such as establishing burdens of proof and setting evidentiary
standards. Not only the language of the judicial opinions, in these
cases, but the arguments made by the parties seeking redress
demonstrate the ways that binary racial logic structures legal thought
and argument.
One insight revealed by the cases is the extent to which the
paradigm is predicated on discernible racial identity. One significant
question, then, in both cases, is who will define and assign racial
labels. This power of assigning race suggests a larger question about
the role of white identity in these cases. Not only do the cases appear
to turn on securing, alternatively, white economic, liberty, and
political interests, but also on entrenching with the force of law a
white subject position in racial designation. Clearly, the latter power
has resonance beyond law, into larger culture, which I discuss in the
closing section. The protection of these distinct white interests
suggests the cultural hegemonic force of legal dispositions of racial
identity.
In Virginia in 1806, two enslaved women, Hannah and her
daughter, asserted their freedom against the man who claimed them
as his slaves." Prior to reaching the substantive issue of their status,
the court had to decide which party, the alleged slave or claiming
master, bore the burden of proof. The political economy of slavery,
including the requisite legal regime, sharply restricted the capacity of
any Black to participate in the production, use, and circulation of
23. Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 (1806).
[45:695
1996] IDENTITY NOTES PART ONE: PLAYING IN THE LIGHT 703
texts, especially any that would satisfy legal evidentiary standards.2 4
Hence, the designation of alleged slaves as the party with the burden
of producing documents would deny to many of them a legal remedy
of freedom for false or illegal enslavement
In Hudgins v. Wrights,25 the Virginia Supreme Court clarified legal
parameters for determining the servitude status of Native Ameri-
cans.26 Native Americans were held as slaves throughout the colonial
era and early antebellum period. However, Virginia formally
recognized by statute Native American enslavement only between the
years 1679 and 1705.27 Because slavery descended matrilineally in
the United States," an alleged slave would have to satisfy two prongs
of a test in order to be entitled to freedom. First, the slave would
have to demonstrate that he or she had a maternal ancestor who was
Native American, opening the possibility that the ancestor legally was
free. A free woman would be incapable of transmitting slave status to
subsequent generations. The next prong, then, would be to actually
demonstrate that the ancestor was not enslaved between 1679 to 1705,
the period of legal Native American enslavement.
Hannah and her daughter claimed their freedom through their
mother/grandmother, Butterwood Nan.29 If Butterwood Nan had
been held as a slave outside of the statutorily prescribed period in
Virginia, the appellees would go free. Thejudges decided in Hudgins
v. Wrights to allocate the burden of proof to the claiming master."0
This meant that he had to prove either that Butterwood Nan was not
Indian, but rather a member of a racial group that could be enslaved
legally, or that she had been enslaved within the statutorily recognized
period. He failed to do either, and Hannah and her child went free.
24. See, ag., A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATrER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 198,258 (1978) [hereinafter HIGGINBOTHAM,
MATTER OF COLOR] (describing some of the colonial origins of the slave codes that prohibited
teachingslaves to read and write); PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY: 1619-1877, at 61, 116-17,
128-29, 134, 142 (1993).
25. 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 (1806).
26. For further discussion of statutes governing Native American enslavement in Virginia,
see sources cited in A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and
Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. Lj. 1967, 1973 n.24 (1989)
[hereinafter Higginbotham, Racial Purity].
27. Hudgins, 11 Va. at 137-39. Judge Tucker's opinion modifies the standard date of repeal,
1705, to 1691. Id. at 139.
28. Id. at 137. For discussion, see HIGGnMOTHAM, MATIER OF COLOR, supra note 24, at 159,
194; Higginbotham, Racial Purity, supra note 26, at 1970-71.
29. Hudgins, 11 Va. at 134-36.
30. "[A]lI American Indians are prima facie free: and that where the fact of their nativity
and descent, in a maternal line, is satisfactorily established, the burthen of proof thereafter lies
upon the party claiming to hold them as slaves." Hudgins, 11 Va. at 139 (Tucker, J.).
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It goes without saying that any outcome in which slaves were freed
remains a cause for celebration. Yet a closer examination of the case
reveals the extent to which the court's and parties' approach to the
conflict was inextricably embedded within a political economy
governed by the black/white paradigm. Although the court is
attempting to locate three races within the racial map-Indian, negro,
and white-its logic is at bottom solely binary in structure and
subordinating in effect.
The court in Hudgins must have understood the potential impact
of its procedural holding on the political economy of American
chattel slavery. At issue was notjust the economic ordering of society,
but also the political and cultural negotiations of domination and
subordination, infliction and resistance, between masters and slaves.
These engagements occurred largely beyond the regulation of the
legal system,"' and it was in the interest of those who owned slaves
to maintain this quasi-feudal authority over bondspeople by circum-
scribing and regulating access to the public world of the courts.
Two well-known Virginia jurists, Judges Tucker and Roane, each
articulated careful, detailed rules to govem future cases in which a
claim of mistaken racial identity might be made as a defense to being
enslaved. 2 These rules operated largely to protect Native Ameri-
cans, and whites as I will discuss, but more permanently associated
slavery with blackness and blackness with slavery. To reconcile this
conflict, the judges employ what prove to be two contradictory vectors
of racial analysis. First, they establish a discretionary standard for
allocating the burden of proof:
In the case of a person visibly appearing to be a negro, the
presumption is, in this country, that he is a slave, and it is incum-
bent on him to make out his right to freedom: but in the case of
a person visibly appearing to be a white man, or an Indian, the
31. THOMAS D. MORUS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW: 1619-1860, at 182-96 (1996)
(discussing scope of master's authority over slaves);A. Leon Higginbotham,Jr. & Anne F.Jacobs,
The "Law Only as an Enemy": The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and
Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969 (1992) (describing mechanics of race,
criminal law, and slave status); see also William W. Fisher, III, Ideology and Imagery in the Law of
Slavey, 68 CHIA.-KENT L REv. 1051, 1073-83 (1993) (discussing role of honor in structuring
authority).
32. An influential and respectedjurist of the time,Judge St. George Tucker, and his prolific
colleague,Judge Roane Spencer, authored the opinions in the case. SeeHIGGINBOTHAM, MATTER
OF COLOR, supra note 24, at 59; MORTONJ. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW:
1780-1860, at 11, 19-20, 23, 44 (1977); MORRIS, supra note 31, at 26, 37, 65, 117, 135, 374, 389,
404-07,416,419-20; A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERs: CREATORS
OF VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE 204, 208-10, 215-20, 236-38 (1981).
[45:695
1996] IDENT=E NoTEs PART ONE: PLAYING IN THE LiGHT 705
presumption is that he is free, and it is necessary for his adversary
to shew that he is a slave.
33
Discernments of physical phenotype thus drive the preliminary
procedural element of allocation of burden of proof.
I call this physical component scopic in that it relies on the
inspecting and scrutinizing gaze of a (white) individual in order to
discern and assign racial identity.' "The distinguishing characteris-
tics of the different species of the human race are so visibly marked,
that those species may be readily discriminated from each other by
mere inspection only."35 Judges are mainly appointed the proper
practitioners of this new taxonomy, however Judge Roane's opinion
suggests that jurors also may be arbiters of racial designation in
Virginia. 6 Thus, in this era, only white men are endowed with this
consummate power of racial assignation."
This scopic rule, and Judge Tucker's defense of it removes any of
the contingency that my own Nicaragua story suggests is present in
any racial taxonomic practice. Instead, there is the enforcement of
a white stance as the only subjective position possible for racial
identification." Those excluded by law from juries and the judiciary
are also excluded from a burgeoning economy of racial surveillance,
buttressed by the rule itself.
Both judges used the opportunity presented by the conflict to
empower with the force of law a nascent taxonomy of phenotypic
race:
Nature has stampt upon the African and his descendants two
characteristic marks, besides the difference of complexion, which
often remain visible long after the characteristic distinction of color
33. Hudgins, 11 Va. at 141 (Roane, J.).
34. Cf Gotanda, "Our Constitution Is Color Blind," supra note 3, at 24 (referring to "rule of
recognition").
35. Hudgins, 11 Va. at 141 (Roane, J.). Judge Tucker agreed:
Suppose three persons, a black or mulatto man or woman with a flat nose and woolly
head; a copper-colored person with longjetty black, straight hair;, and one with a fair
complexion, brown hair, not woolly nor inclining thereto, with a prominent Roman
nose, were brought together before a judge upon a writ of habeas corpus, on the
ground of false imprisonment and detention in slavery.... How must ajudge act in
such a case? I answer he must judge from his own view.
Id. at 140 (TuckerJ.).
36. Id. at 141 (Roane,J.).
37. "[T] hroughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was,...
comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women
could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names .... " Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973). While I might take issue with the extent to which the
material lives of slaves and white women were similar, in the context of direct participation in
crafting the racial taxonomy, both were excluded from legal subjectivity.
38. For discussions of subject positions and law, see James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The
Postmodern Su!ject in Legal Themy, 62 COLO. L. REV. 489 (1991).
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either disappears or becomes doubtful: a flat nose and woolly head
of hair. The latter of these characteristics disappears the last of all:
and so strong an ingredient in the African constitution is this latter
character, that it predominates uniformly where the party is in
equal degree descended from parents of different complexions,
whether white or Indians; giving to the jet black lank hair of the
Indian a degree of flexure, which never fails to betray that the party
distinguished by it, cannot trace his lineage purely from the race of
native Americans. 9
The court thereby gives legal determinacy to what was scientifically
uncertain and socially contested. It establishes as legal standard the
individual judges' perceptions of racial distinction.
The scopic rule stands in contrast as the more standard rule of
determining race according to genealogy, or "blood." In fact, the
formula of hypodescent stated that one's race would not be deter-
mined by appearance, but by ancestry.4" However, the court employs
this rule, too, in resolving Hannah's case. The court held that the
appellees would go free if they could trace their lineage back to a
Native American woman who herself would have transmitted free
status to a child. Hence, ancestry, not appearance, governs the
substantive disposition of the case.
The court adopts two conflicting vectors of analysis in order to map
race in early national Virginia. The rule of hypodescent runs along
a formalist path of employing "objective" principles of genealogy and
lineage. The other rule stems from local scopic determinations made
by physical judicial inspection. These two rules appear irreconcil-
able on their face. I suggest, however, that the rules can be explained
through attention to the subtext of the case: safeguarding various
material interests of whites, in addition to a white subject position.
Obviously the rule of hypodescent worked to secure economic
interests in slavery. Designating an individual as Black subjected that
person to a series of legal disabilities that made it more difficult to
claim freedom.
But the conflict in Hudgins brought to light a latent danger of
slavery for whites: the loss of a liberty interest. The laws severely
restricting slaves, designed to protect the economic and political
39. Hudgins, 11 Va. at 139 (Tucker, J.).
40. See Gotanda, "Our Constitution Is Color Blind," supra note 3, at 23-26 ("Rule of descent:
(a) Any person with a known trace of African ancestry is Black, notwithstanding that person's
visual appearance."); see also Harris, supra note 3, at 1738 nn.137-38.
41. Although I argue these vectors travel different paths, an instance of their intersection
might be in the legal designation of the "mulatto," a term used interchangeably to describe
those children of white and black parents as well as very fair-skinned Blacks.
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interests of whites in their slaves, effectively prevented those claimed
as slaves from contesting their status. As the quandary of the
appellees in Hudgins suggested, however, whites also might find
themselves on the accused end of being a slave. Judge Roane tellingly
shares his concern: "In the present case it is not and cannot be
denied that the appellees have entirely the appearance of white
people: and how does the appellant attempt to deprive them of the
blessing of liberty to which all such persons are entitled?"' Note
that although this case nominally is about the parameters of Native
American enslavement, Judge Roane's main focus seems to be the
safeguarding of whites from accidentally falling into the perils of
slavery." This is done by coding actual legal rights to race and
racializing even the rhetoric of liberty interests.' Simultaneous
protection of white economic and liberty interests can only be
accomplished by utilizing differing modes of racial analysis and
surveillance which, at their core, articulate white identity and code
rights and liberty to it.
A second signal mechanism driving the binary legal mode is its
aspirat*onal quality that masks a disciplining function. The following
language from Judge Tucker isolates Black Americans from both
whites and Native Americans.
Its operation is still more powerful where the mixture happens
between persons descended equally from European and African
parents. So pointed is this distinction between natives of Africa and
the aborigines of America, that a man might as easily mistake the
glossy, jetty cloathing [sic] of an American bear for the wool of a
black sheep, as the hair of an American Indian for that of an
42. Hudgins, 11 Va. at 141. Professor Ian Haney L6pez aptly describes the absurdity of the
reasoning: "After unknown lives lost in slavery,Judge Tucker freed three generations of women
because Hannah's hair was long and straight." Haney L6pez, Social Construction, supra note 3,
at 2; see also HIGGINBOTHAM, MATrER OF COLOR, supra note 24, at 59-60 (discussingjudicial views
of racialized freedom manifest in Hudgins v. Wights); Higginbotham, Racial Purity, supra note
26, at 1985-88 (focusing on sex and gender aspects in construction of race in Hudgins).
43. Judge Roane's fears are echoed by his colleaguejudge Tucker: "All whitepersons are and
ever have been free in this country. If one evidently white, be notwithstanding claimed as a slave,
the proof lies on the party claiming to make the other his slave." Hudgins, 11 Va. at 139 (italics
in original); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Cheryl Harris makes a similar point about
the racial logic of the decision. Harris, supra note 3, at 1745-50 (explaining that Plessy
acknowledged that whites could protect their property interest and reputation in being white,
thus effectively protecting "whiteness" from intrusion and defining boundaries around
"whiteness" as property).
44. Note that the court holds not only that whites and Indians do not have a burden of
proof in such cases, but also dictates that those appearing negro shall remain in custody pending
adjudication while those appearing otherwise will remain unfree. Hudgins, 11 Va. at 140. For
discussion of the racialization of white liberty interests, see EDMUND MORGAN, AMERICAN
SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1975).
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African. Upon these distinctions as connected with our laws, the
burthen of proof depends.45
Racial integrity of both whites and Native Americans is indicated by
the power of Black admixture to corrupt the purity of each of these
"fragile" races and to dilute the integrity of the scopically determined
phenotype.
More than rhetoric disciplined the Native American parties. Not
only had blackness been coded to servitude, but whiteness had been
coded to liberty rights. If considered scopically white, the appellees
could evade the burden of proof. This conundrum is reflected in the
appellee's opening statement: "This is not a common case of mere
blacks suing for their freedom; but of persons perfectly white."46 The
appellees, though claiming freedom substantively through Native
American ancestry, employed the rhetoric of the scopic economy,
hence invoking whites' fear of being accidentally enslaved.
Crafting an argument to secure rights structured to secure white
economic and liberty interests meant that the appellees had to situate
themselves as people who could be removed from chattel slavery
without altering its fundamental order. The move then is located
firmly within the paradigm of binary race rather than attempting to
locate the appellees altogether outside of it.47 The appellees'
argument demonstrates that these racial divisions, the creation of
whiteness as something to be aspired to and blackness to be distanced
from, was already extant and powerful in this early moment in
national consciousness.
The appellant negotiated within the same logic, attempting then to
distance the alleged slaves from the security of whiteness. The
attorney insisted that the chancellor had been disabled by his own
resonance with the appearance of appellees: "[T]he circumstance of
their being white operated on the mind of the chancellor."48 He
went on to warn the Supreme Court: "The circumstance of the
45. Hudgins, 11 Va. at 139-40 (Tucker, J.).
46. Id. at 135 (italics in original).
47. Ronald Takaki notes that, ironically, the racialization of Native Americans probably
served a similar purpose in the formation of colonial American identity. Ronald Takaki says,
"Indian identity became a matter of 'descent': their racial markers indicated inerasable
qualities of savagery." RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICULTURAL
AMERICA 38 (1993). I argue that Hudgins cannot be understood outside of the context of
American chattel slavery and the efforts by law to code Blacks as rightsless within that political
economy. Takaki says of the colonial juxtaposition of Indians as racial savages: "This social
construction of race occurred within the economic context of competition over land. The
colonists argued that entitlement to land required its utilization." Id. at 39; see also Carol M.
Rose, Possession as the Origin of Propery, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 85-88 (1985) (describing Native
American and colonial norms of property use and ownership).
48. Hudgins, 11 Va. at 134.
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appellees' being white, has been mentioned, more to excite the
feelings of the court as men, than to address them as judges."49
Thus each side inexorably negotiated within the confines of the
paradigm, further inscribing its logic and power.
Ultimately, the various deployments of binary logic of Hudgins
reveals something implicit in the black/white paradigm that is often
overlooked by legal racial theorists. The very label "black/white"
suggests parity of the races within the paradigm. It evokes two equal
poles on a line that together make up the category race. Hence race
itself as a construct appears to be neutral; everyone has one, it is
merely a matter of identification." The appearance of neutrality is
critical in order to maintain the continuing power of the paradigm.
With my Nicaragua story I hoped to encourage readers to interro-
gate the seeming determinacy of the race classifications. However, it
is also important to question the seeming neutrality of the shell of
"race" within which component parts interact. Hudgins makes clear
that the black/white paradigm arising from chattel slavery was not
merely a set of categories composing a taxonomy, but a set of
dynamic juxtapositions with their own internal hierarchy, elaborated
through the assignment of rights.5" The language of both Judges
Tucker and Roane, as well as the arguments of the lawyers, suggests
the hegemonic nature of the paradigm.52 The logic of the paradigm
itself continually hides internal inconsistencies, dominant subject
positions encoded with legal power, and even its own self-reinforcing
mechanism.
The Hudgins opinion remains one of the most stark examples of
the role of law in creating the national racial taxonomy. Its language
illustrates how the national racial taxonomy took differences of
phenotype and reified them into bases for legal and social discrimina-
tion and violence. 3 The hegemonic force of Hudgins utilizes the
49. Id. at 136.
50. Cf Gotanda, "Our Constitution Is Color Blind, "supra note 3, at 25-26.
51. Stephanie Wildman has written extensively about the privileging dynamic arising from
dyadic logic. WILDMAN, supra note 19; see also Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis,
Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881 (1996).
Privilege is distinct from domination and subordination.
Domination, subordination, and privilege are like three heads of a hydra. Attacking the most
visible heads, domination and subordination, trying bravely to chop them up into little pieces,
will not kill the third head, privilege. Like a mythic multi-headed hydra, which will inevitably
grow another head if all are not slain, discrimination cannot be ended by focusing only on active
acts of subordination and domination. Yet the seeming parity suggested by "black/white
paradigm" itself hinders the ability to recognize and combat privilege.
52. Cf EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 25-31
(1974).
53. See generally Haney L6pez, White ly Law, supra note 19.
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black/white paradigm to more firmly inscribe slave status onto Blacks,
ending any ambiguities of the racial coding of enslaved status that
may have remained from colonial white servitude.
The cases show the use of the binary paradigm in crafting a white
identity. In Hudgins, blackness is treated narrowly, limited in order
to protect white liberty, which in this instance outweighs economic
concerns. Fifty years later, the same binary mode of reasoning led a
court to define blackness far more expansively, and whiteness more
narrowly. But even with a different cut, the shift still secures white
interests, albeit of a different sort. This shifting construction of both
blackness and whiteness illuminates both the fluidity of racial
classifying practices, and the inexorable nature of the securing of
white rights.
In Hudgins, Native Americans argued their way out of a chattel
slavery by legally linking it to Black Americans. Across this half
century, in People v. Hal4 Chinese residents of California were
situated within a completely different political economic structure.
Yet, even across 3000 miles and half a century, a paradigm of binary
racial reasoning functioned hegemonically to govern the judicial
resolution of where to locate a third race. In Hudgins, Native
Americans negotiated a burgeoning racial structure in Virginia. In
Hall, Chinese attempted a similar maneuver, albeit in the context of
statutory interpretation rather than matters of initial procedure.
Unlike Hudgins, in Hall, literal liberty interests were not at stake.
Instead the conflict was over access to the courtroom. However, as
the discussion indicates, white interests still appeared paramount and
were protected judicially along two axes.
At issue was a statute that coded privilege and rights to whites in an
analogous fashion to Hudgins v. Wrights. The court had to racially
locate Chinese within a prohibitory statute: "No black or mulatto
person, or Indian, shall be permitted to give evidence in favor of, or
against, a white person."5 While there is a nascent debate among
legal scholars over the motivations behind the statute,56 its impact is
54. 4 Cal. 399 (1854).
55. Act of Apr. 16, 1850, ch. 99, § 14, 1850 Cal. Stat. 229, 230, amended byAct of Mar. 18,
1863, ch. 70, 1863 Cal. Stat. 69, repealed by omission from codification Cal. penal Code § 1321
(1872) (officially repealed, Act of Mar. 30, 1955, ch. 48, § 1, 1955 Cal. Stat. 488, 489).
Interestingly, the original statute read "against any white person." In reprinting the statute, the
California Supreme Court changed the language to "against a white man." People v. Hall, 4 Cal.
399, 399 (1854) (emphasis added). Professor Neil Gotanda notes that this statute was passed
prior to California's admission to the Union. Gotanda, "OtherNon-Whites, "supra note 3, at 1189.
56. On the one hand, in his reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, Thomas Joo argues
that the interests at issue in Hall were perceived as political ones. Joo notes that in contrast,
many of the Chinese struggles for civil rights following Hall may have been supported by the
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unarguable. Hannah and her daughter aligned themselves with
whiteness in order to gain freedom. For the Chinese in Hall, the
taxonomic racial choices would be equally clear and stark.
People v. Hall is a far more well-known and analyzed case than
Hudgins v. Wrights.17 The conflict giving rise to the case itself
implicated racial practices very sharply. The state charged Hall, a
white man, with the murder of Ling Sing, a Chinese man. Hall was
convicted following a trial that included the testimony of three
Chinese witnesses. The California Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, concluding that the Chinese testimony had been improp-
erly admitted under the statute. It held that the statute applied to all
non-whites and that the Chinese were prohibited from testifying
against whites.
Professor Charles McClain reports the outrage of the Chinese
community over the Hall decision." Implicated was not just the
value of Chinese lives, but the general availability of the courtroom as
a physical and discursive site. The courts are where people go to
assert their rights, from protection against violence to enforcement of
contracts.59 As one commentator points out, the segregation of
Chinese/white life also meant that Chinese might not have white
witnesses to support legal claims they might make.' Hence, in
courts because economic rights were at issue. He contends that Blacks in the late nineteenth
century were seen as desirous of political and social rights, demanding admission into the full
life of the country. Chinese were seen as participating in the market life of the country, a less
threatening arena. Thus the Chinese may have lost in Hall because the issue was political rather
than economic rights. SeeThomas WuilJoo, New "Conspiray Theory"of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Nineteenth Century Chinese Civil Rights Cases and the Development of Substantive Due Process
Jurisprudence, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 353, 358 (1995) (detailing Hall decision where court saw "actual
and present danger" of Chinese gaining full membership in society).
Sumi Cho, on the other hand, argues persuasively that Hall can be read as a protection of
white economic interests. White miners raided Chinese mining camps, brutalizing the residents.
Cho points out that the victims were then precluded by law from bringing criminal charges,
Cho thus collapses the distinction between economic and political rights. Sumi Cho, Model
Minority Mythology and Affirmative Action: The Racialization of Asian-Americans in Anti-
Discrimination Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
57. See, ag., Gotanda, "Other Non-Whites,"supra note 3, at 1188-89; CharlesJ. McClain, Jr.,
The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72
CAi. L. REv. 529, 548-53 (1984);Joo, supra note 56, at 361-63; Cho, supra note 56.
58. McClain, supra note 57, at 550-51. McClain asserts that"[o]f all the wrongs visited upon
the Chinese in the period from 1850 to 1870, the ban on their testimony ... rankled most
deeply." IL at 551.
59. Speer v. See Yup Co., 13 Cal. 73 (1859). Although a civil case, the judges use Hall as
dispositive.
60. See, eg., Michael A. Scaperlanda, The Paradox of a Title: Discrimination Within the Anti-
Discrimination Provisions of the Immigration Refonn and Control Act of 1986, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 1043,
1068 ("The political branches of the federal government, free from judicial interference, have
deported resident aliens of Chinese descent, some of whom had resided in this country for
twenty years, because they could not prove residency through white wimesses."); see also id at
1057.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
addition to seeking remedies for criminal acts, access to the court-
room is critical to negotiating civil life in America.
Moreover, Chinese residents of the United States were precluded
from citizenship and exercise of the franchise.6' In many areas of
California they lived in segregated communities, Chinatowns.62 Thus
courts provided one of the few public, formal spaces in which Chinese
could participate in mainstream American political life. They were
able to exercise rights not only in an individual sense, but in the sense
of a group asserting its collective right to be recognized as Americans.
Chinese participation in rights discourse reminded Californians that
the Chinese were more than mere temporary laborers whom they
wished would leave during economic downturns. Many had come to
stay.
Finally, for the Chinese, the act of speaking in the courtroom was
itself significant. White Californiansjustified the exclusion of Chinese
in part on language differences. Participation in legal discourse not
only forced whites to encounter the Chinese voice as coherent and
comprehensible, but injected Chinese interests and concerns into this
narrow slice of public life. Hence this least democratic space became
a primary space for white/Chinese engagement.
The challenge by Hall to his conviction dramatically contested
Chinese participation in this space. In interpreting the statute, the
court said: "The evident intention of the Act was to throw around the
citizen a protection for life and property, which could only be secured
by removing him above the corrupting influences of degraded
castes."6' Thus, in seeking their own justice (or defending them-
selves from others seeking it), whites were not to have to encounter
noxious others. The case also demonstrates how white interests were
again at the foreground of the Hall decision, despite the facial dispute
over Chinese rights.' In Hudgins, the main concern was to protect
61. See, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Histoica Constitutional and
Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1425-30 (1993).
62. This was so despite the fact that Chinese residents of California contributed through
a foreign mining tax five million dollars, or 25-50% of all state revenues in California, over a
period of close to 20 years. See TAx.AI, supra note 47, at 195.
63. Hall 4 Cal. at 403. "The European white man who comes here would not be shielded
from the testimony of the degraded and demoralized caste, while the Negro, fresh from the
coast of Africa, or the Indian of Patagonia, the Kanaka, South Sea Islander, or New Hollander,
would be admitted upon their arrival, to testify against white citizens in our courts of law." Id.
at 402.
64. In at least one other jurisdiction, a judge interpreted the statute so as to avoid an
interaction between whites and non-whites in the courtroom. Interpreting a statute similar to
California's, one Ohio judge wrote:
No matter how pure the character, yet, if the color is not right, the man can not testify.
The truth shall not be received from a black man, to settle a controversy where a white
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whites from the autocracy of chattel slavery. In Hall it was to
safeguard the courtroom as a political space that could be secured to
whites.
65
As mentioned earlier, the achievement of this pure space is done
along two axes. Not only would whites be able to testify as a
fundamental right of whiteness, but also they would be protected
from having to engage with non-whites through the latter's testimo-
ny.6 6 Hence the statute grants to whites both the positive right to
participate in a court of law, and the negative right to be free, not just
from challenges from people of color, but from any racially integrated
legal interaction. The fact that testimony could not be offered in any
civil case in which a white person was a party, or in any criminal case
"in favor of, or against a white man" supports this conclusion. 7 The
larger connotations of Chinese testimony for or against whites is
suggested by the court: "The same rule which would admit them to
testify, would admit them to all the equal rights of citizenship, and we
might soon see them at the polls, in the jury box, upon the bench,
and in our legislative halls."' Thus, what seems to be a moment of
racial confusion, making the falsely binary paradigm vulnerable to
rectification, again is resolved with primary attention to white
interests.
The court in Hall had to decide how to map Chinese in California,
the parallel challenge of mapping Native Americans in Virginia's
economy of slavery. As in Hudgins, determinacy was wrought from
threatened racial chaos. Binary logic also shapes Hall in that the
court exhibits a desire to articulate race out of physical demarcations.
Taxonomic practices rest on what is visibly observable, as in the scopic
rule in Hudgins- "These [physical differences between the different
races of mankind] were general in their character, and limited to
those visible and palpable variations which could not escape the
attention of the most common observer."69 This again suggests an
inspection in which the scrutinizing gaze will reveal racial classifica-
tion. And once again this is itself based on an implicitly shared
man is a party. Let a man be Christian or infidel; let him be Turk, Jew, or
Mahometan; let him be of good character or bad; even let him be sunk to the lowest
depths of degradation; he may be a witness in our courts if he is not black.
Jordan v. Smith, 14 Ohio 199 (1846).
65. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
67. Hagl 4 Cal. at 399.
68. I& at 404.
69. Id. at 400.
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recognition of phenotype and mixture, linking "the most common
observer" to the judges in a shared community of racial knowledge. 0
The statute describes the organization of race for Blacks, whites,
and Native Americans. The Chinese in Hall raised to the court the
possibility of recognizing, then, a fourth race, a race that was neither
Black, nor Native, nor white, and thus completely outside of the scope
of the statute. Such an interpretation would have maintained the
special statutory privileging to whites along the axis of being protected
from Indian and Black testimony. It would not have meant that
Chinese too could avoid engagement with these "degraded castes."
It would however have exposed whites to Chinese in the courtroom,
the second axis of the privileging.
The court at first employed a sort of combination of scientific
inquiry and original intent to assess whether the Chinese were
included within the term "Indian." In a lengthy treatment of history,
the court noted that at the time of the statute "there were but three
distinct types of the human species"7v and that Indian included all
of those not white or Negro.72 "We have adverted to these specula-
tions for the purpose of showing that the name of Indian, from the
time of Columbus to the present day, has been used to designate, not
alone the North American Indian, but the whole of the Mongolian
race, and that the name, though first applied probably through
mistake, was afterwards continued as appropriate on account of the
supposed common origin."' Thus was the mistaken geography of
Christopher Columbus established as foundational in American racial
taxonomy.
As in Hudgins, American race is inextricably wound around the
centrality of white identity, the need to define it and protect it. Again
this can only be done through classifying and marking other groups.
Although not directly implicated, blackness again becomes a pivotal
concept in the racial designation of whiteness. The court begins by
noting that the criminal and civil statutes employ different language:
while the criminal code prohibits testimony against whites by "Black,
or Mulatto person, or Indian," the civil code used the word "Negro"
in place of "Black."74 The court concludes:
The word "Black" may include all Negroes, but the term "Negro"
does not include all Black persons.
70. Id.
71. Id at 401.
72. Id at 402.
73. Id
74. See supra note 55 and accompanying text; see also Ha/ 4 Cal. at 403.
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By the use of this term in this connection, we understand it to
mean the opposite of "White," and that it should be taken as
contradistinguished from all White persons.
In using the words ... the Legislature ... adopted the most
comprehensive terms to embrace every known class or shade of
color, as the apparent design was to protect the White person from
the influence of all testimony other than that of persons of the
same caste. The use of these terms must, by every sound rule of
construction, exclude every one who is not of white blood. 5
Thus is blackness the residue left once whiteness has been defined
and assigned.
Within binary hegemonic logic, there is no space for securing
specifically Chinese rights. Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of the
decision, the political arguments by the Chinese against their own
subordination were influenced by the black/white paradigm. With
whiteness coded to rights, they attempted to argue for their own
cultural and legal distancing from the historically subjugated races
targeted in the statute. Charles McClain reports that one "prominent
San Francisco merchant" wrote in an open letter to the governor
expressing bitterness at their linkage to other non-whites:
[O]f late days, your honorable people have established a new
practice. They have come to the conclusion that we Chinese are
the same as Indians and Negroes, and your courts will not allow us
to bear witness. And yet these Indians know nothing about the
relations of society; they know no mutual respect; they wear neither
clothes nor shoes; they live in wild places and [in] caves.76
Such statements, while racist, must be understood as influenced in
some part by the disciplining mechanism of binarism. The
classificatory practices of the American racial taxonomy are undeni-
ably political and inherently not neutral.
The law demanded that groups seeking rights reject and cast as
inferior the non-white end of the pole. Sometimes they won rights,
and sometimes they did not. Hannah and her daughter were able to
win under a combination of a scopic and genealogical rule designed
to protect white liberty and economic interests; the Chinese could
not. The force of racial binarism links Hudgins and Hall across half
a century and distinct political economies. In each, the assertion of
rights by the non-Black colored plaintiff is preceded and governed by
a paradigm of binary identity formation. Each case, presenting a
75. Ha4 4 Cal. at 403.
76. McClain, supra note 57, at 550 (footnotes omitted).
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moment of instability, also presented an opportunity for hegemonic
reinscription."
Hudgins secures slavery as a safe space for whites and those Native
Americans who meet ajudicial inspection of phenotype. Hallsecures
the more specific site of the courtroom for whites. Judicial articula-
tion of a racial taxonomy attempted to make the resolution of these
cases appear neutral. The paradigm operated as a framework within
which judges could simultaneously search for the meaning of white
and colored identity formation and then assign legal rights along the
structure of the created taxonomy. Racial analysis appears primarily
motivated to secure white interests in different political economies.
Thus, in these two cases, the structure of binary legal construction
and reasoning barred opportunities for distinct, legally recognized
identity formation by those who were neither Black nor white. The
paradigm ultimately cast non-Black people of color in the position of
arguing within a binary model of identity formation that they were
racially (scopically or biologically) white and hence should be legally
white, as well. This came to the fore in subsequent cases, foreshad-
owed by Hudgins and Hal 78 Of course, this paradox meant that
winning as in Hudgins would remain the exception, but would give
judges repeated opportunities to theorize and articulate with the force
of law the meaning of white identity. Through this process, Black
subordination was also further inscribed into the national legal and
social consciousness. The historical paradigm of black and white
77. With whites firmly situated at the top of the racial hierarchy with rights protected, the
main question then was who would be at the bottom. This, of course, varied. The language
quoted in the opinion suggests that the court in Hall recognized that some "domestic" Blacks
and Native Americans were relatively civilized. It implicitly appealed to fairness to this group
by arguing that they could not be excluded while the "degraded tribes" were permitted into the
courtroom. In a later California decision, the court said: "'The Chinese are vastly superior to
the negro, but they are a race entirely different from ours and never can assimilate' and I don't
think it desirable that they should and for that reason I don't think it desirable that they could
come here." Joo, supra note 56, at 364 (quoting CHRIsTIAN G. FRITZ, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN
CALIFORNIA: THE COURT OF OGDEN HOFFMAN, 1851-1892, at 247 (1991)). On the other hand,
the court also said: "It can hardly be supposed that any Legislature would attempt this by
excluding domestic Negroes and Indians, who not frequently [sic] have correct notions of their
obligations to society, and turning loose upon the community the more degraded tribes of the
same species, who have nothing in common with us, in language, country or laws." Hall, 4 Cal.
at 403.
78. Ian Haney L6pez examines cases of the late 19th century in which East and South
Asians attempted to establish their whiteness in order to secure citizenship. He documents the
ways in which the cases became increasingly absurd as each group attempted to distance its own
American racial formation from the prior group that had been cast into non-whiteness and
hence non-citizenship. Haney L6pez, White y Law, supra note 19. Indeed, distancing moves
occurred in some of these cases as well. See, e.g., Pat 1L Chew, Asian Americans: The ",eticent"
Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MAR L. REV. 1, 14-16 (1994) (discussing Ozawa v. United
States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922)); CharlesJ. McClain, Tortuous Path, Elusive Goal: The Asian Quest for
American Citizenship, 2 ASIAN LJ. 33, 44-47 (1995) (discussing Ozawa).
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served numerous interests of privilege and regulation, none of them
anti-racist in nature.
Not surprisingly, the paradigm of racial binarism has raised
obstacles in contemporary racial coalition building. At the end of
1995, on the eve of the next century of racial struggle, it remains
difficult to confront the painful realities of the ways in which non-
white groups cast each other downwards on our way toward asserting
our humanity. In excavating historical sites of paradigm instability
and entrenchment, I hope to create contemporary space for
understanding and collective forward movement. I have identified in
Hudgins and Hall not only moments when the paradigm triumphed,
but moments when its validity was cast momentarily into doubt by the
assertions of racial identity of non-Black and non-white groups. These
are moments I term categorical confusion in which the taxonomic
structure at hand appears inadequate to the classificatory measures
called for.
Categorical confusion creates ruptures in the security of our racial
taxonomic structure, calling into question the practices by which we
identify and label people. It is at these times that progressive lawyers,
activists, and judges can cast light into the breach and demonstrate
the hegemonic functioning of American racial construction, enabling
counter-hegemonic moves. By destabilizing the seeming determinacy
of race, we can also destabilize and better resist the inevitable
privileging and subordinating dynamics criss-crossing the American
racial map.
IV. COUNTER-CATEGORICAL PRACTICE
Such a confusion of categories occurs in a moment identified by
Professor Robert Chang in his essay in this issue. Professor Chang
begins his essay with a line spoken by a Korean grocer to a Black man
in Spike Lee's Do the Right Thing. "I Black. You, me, same. We
same."79  The categorical confusion embedded in this textual
assertion arises from the grocer's apparent transgression of the
American taxonomic distinction between, and inscription of differ-
ence onto, Blacks and Koreans. This celluloid interaction, as Chang
points out, creates an important space in the examination of racial
subjectivity and positionality. It is also an apt point with which to
conclude my interrogation of the black/white paradigm.
79. RobertS. Chang, The End of Innocen or Politics After the FaU of the Essential Subjec 45 AM.
U. L. REv. 687 (1995) (quoting SPIKE LEE, Do THE RIGHT THING (Forty Acres and a Mule
Filmworks 1989)).
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The line is spoken in the concluding scene of the film. Several of
Lee's Black characters bum down the neighborhood white-owned
pizzeria, destroying the actual and metaphoric space in which they
had interacted with whites as neighbors, consumers, and employees.
The Korean grocer issues his taxonomic challenge in response to a
threat by a Black character to burn down the grocery as well.
Lee's film primarily explores relations between working-class whites
with strong ethnic identities and working-class and poor African
Americans. Yet Lee's rendering reflects a much richer and nuanced
depiction of urban communities than the view induced by analytic
reliance on the black/white paradigm. The black/white paradigm
encourages a national vision of poor, urban areas as solely "black"
spaces voided by fleeing whites."0 This image ignores not only the
richness of Black life in these communities, but more significantly,
that other groups, neither black nor white, are actively coming to these
areas, enriching them with their own multiple cultures and hopes.81
Moreover, there is no language with which the grocer can express
his own location within American racism. The grocer is neither white
nor Black, yet, in this instance, the neighborhood conflict plays out
in binary fashion. An expression of some sort of affiliation or politics
is demanded, but the grocer confronts a paucity of language with
which to describe positions in the American racial hierarchy. His
assertion is not one of physical or phenotypic Blackness, but of
discursive and geographic blackness. This is blackness as non-
whiteness within dyadic logic. Unlike in Hall the grocer's race is
recognized by law as distinct from Black or white, but he remains
absent within the discursive world of American racial dynamics.
Abandoning the binary paradigm permits a more accurate and
legally constructive insight into urban areas as sites of physical
concentration of different non-white groups into spaces with many
dreams and scarce resources. Urban sites become highly flammable
as public and private housing, jobs, business ownership, and cultural
space become vigorously and bitterly contested commodities.82
80. See generallyJohn 0. Calmore, Radaised Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing a
Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair," 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233 (1995) (discussing dynamics
of urban segregation).
81. According to Professor Beverly Baker-Kelly, "Immigrants primarily flock to six
metropolitan areas in the United States." Beverly Baker-Kelly, United States Immigration: A Wake
Up Call , 37 How. LJ. 283, 303 (1994/95). "According to the 1990 census, 70% of the adults
residing in Miami, 44% of the adults residing in Los Angeles, and 33% of the adults residing in
New York City are foreign-born." Id. at 288 (footnote omitted).
82. For discussions of such conflicts, see for example, Baker-Kelly, supra note 81, at 287-91;
Selena Dong, Note, "Too Many Asians": The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination Against Asian-
Americans and Preserving Affirmative Action, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1030-38 (1995) (discussing
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This material dynamic turns discursive as conflicts over resources
metamorphose into conflicts over literal and figurative racial turf,
hierarchies of oppression, and cultural schisms. The hegemonic force
of the black/white specter orders group engagement at the level of
destructively nationalist visions of racial desert rather than encourag-
ing collective progressive coalition-building and forward movement.
At the end of Do the Right Thing, Sal's Pizzeria is burned down. The
Korean grocery store is not. Like Sal's, however, the grocery store is
a site of commerce in which various members of the community
contest both physical and metaphoric space. The functional and
symbolic operation of the grocery serves as a powerful and necessary
reminder of the falsity of the black/white paradigm in a contempo-
rary context. The pending legal conflicts discussed demand an
expanded understanding of racial structures and identity formation.
My Nicaragua story suggests that more fluid and inclusive racial
structures must be adopted. Moreover, Hudgins and Hall suggest the
need for an ongoing engagement with the politics that would
inevitably underlie any racial regime in the United States.
I want to conclude by returning to the statement made by the
Korean grocer: "I Black. You, me, same. We same." Lee casts the
grocer as a stand-in for those excluded by racial binarism. The
grocer's statement creates a moment of rupture in the fixity of the
American taxonomy of race. It thus opens the door for different
political readings of the meaning of the challenge. Yet not all
statements that are counter-categorical are likewise counter-hegemon-
ic. A statement may expose the hierarchy but do nothing to
challenge or reform it. Some counter-categorical actions may even
reinforce the hierarchy, as in proclamations of whiteness in Hudgins
and Hall The character's statement might have been either a positive
effort to restructure the American racial paradigm or merely a self-
serving evasion of its force.
Certainly none of these more positive readings can fairly be
ascribed to this character or any actual person's adoption of a black
positionality absent more careful interrogation into the politics of the
moment and the individual. But the rupture does give us insight into
dynamics masked by the dyadic and hierarchical racial logic.
conflicts in magnet schools); Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the
Lawyer's Duty to Work for the Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REV. 901, 947-49 (1995) (discussing
conflicts in housing); Reginald Leamon Robinson, "The Other Against Itself": Deconstructing the
Violent Discourse Between Korean and African Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 15, 35-113 (1993)
(analyzing relationship between African-American and' Korean-American communities);
Symposium, Los Angeles, April 29, 1992 and Beyond: The Law, Issues, and Perspectives, 66 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1571-1673 (1993) (containing commentaries on 1992 riots in Los Angeles).
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By searching for the ruptures that expose the constructed nature
of categories, we enable a conscious dialogue about how and when to
go about the inevitable taxonomic practices that will arise in the civil
rights struggle. Ultimately, groups of all colors must employ counter-
categorical and counter-hegemonic racial practices to defeat the
debilitating force of the black/white paradigm.
CONCLUSION
The legal literature on the social construction of race concentrates
mainly on making the point that race is not a natural or a biological
category, using that argument to challenge contemporary race-based
legal regimes. In this Essay, I have tried to suggest that we need to go
further; saying that race is socially constructed is not enough. We
need to study how race is socially constructed. By themselves, the
cases I discussed in this Essay cannot prove anything. But they do, I
think, suggest a complex and contradictory practice worthy of further
investigation. The courts rely on inconsistent notions of the nature
of race, even as they confidently deploy race as a natural, observable
category. The nature of race varies depending on the race being
discussed. "Whiteness" is "caused" by factors very different than
"blackness." Racial categories are never solely the possession of the
dominant culture; they are internalized and, in part, created by
subordinate groups. Finally, racial categories are constructed around
interests, but in a way that is not reducible to "white conspiracy" nor
to manifest sociobiological destiny.
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